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Abstract
Large distributed multiagent systems are characterized by vast numbers of agents trying to gain
access to limited resources in an unpredictable environment. Agents in these system continuously
switch strategies in order to opportunistically find improvements in their utilities. We have
analyzed the fluctuations around equilibrium that arise from strategy switching and discovered
the existence of a new phenomenon. It consists of the appearance of sudden bursts of activity
that punctuate the fixed point, and is due to an effective random walk consistent with overall
stability. This clustered volatility is followed by relaxation to the fixed point but with different
strategy mixes from the previous one. This phenomenon is quite general for systems in which
agents explore strategies in search of local improvements.
1 Introduction
Large distributed multiagent systems are characterized by vast numbers of
agents trying to gain access to limited resources in an unpredictable environment.
This description applies to a wide range of systems, ranging from economies to
computer networks and telecommunications. Because of this common character-
ization, insights and results from one type of multiagent system can at times be
useful in another. For example, it has been pointed out several times that markets
are not only of use in human societies, but can also be fruitful in the design and
implementation of other large distributed systems[1–10].
In a distributed system, be it social or computational, agents do not always
have complete information about the system in which they are embedded. This
follows from their bounded rationality [11], i.e. the impossibility of choosing
optimal strategies in a very complex setting. Bounded rationality stems from
either lack of perfect information about the state of the system, or the inability on
the part of agents to compute all possible outcomes in a timely fashion. Under
such conditions, agents continuously switch between different behavioral modes
in response to a constantly changing environment [12].
Studies of distributed systems have shown that when there is resource con-
tention in the presence of delays, their dynamics is very complex, giving rise
to nonlinear oscillations and chaos which drive the system far from optimality
[13–16]. In some cases one can still observe a stable equilibrium . In the case of
distributed computation, this undesirable behavior can be controlled through the
introduction of local reward procedures, whereby the relative number of agents
following effective strategies is increased at the expense of the others [17]. This
procedure, which generates a diverse population out of an essentially homoge-
neous one, is able to control chaos in distributed computational systems through
a series of dynamical bifurcations into a stable fixed point.
In this paper we study the effect of fluctuations on the model originally
proposed by Hogg and Huberman [17] to analyze and control a distributed
computational system. The model incorporates two essential elements that govern
local decisions by the agents: uncertainty and strategies. Uncertainty, as discussed
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above, is related to bounded rationality. Strategies are behavioral modes on the
part of agents, behaviors that are used to gain access to resources contested by
other agents. Since agents can switch between strategies, the system can evolve
into a multitude of different configurations, some of which can lead to enhanced
adaptability as well as stability [18].
When we analyzed the fluctuations that arise from the fact that agents can
temporarily change strategies, we discovered the existence of a new phenomenon.
This phenomenon appears whenever the control mechanism is active and the
system is close to equilibrium. As the dynamics of the multiagent system unfolds,
the equilibrium state becomes punctuated by episodes of clustered volatility that
take place at random. These bursts are caused by an effective random walk in the
space of strategies, and they appear even in the case of large numbers of agents.
This random walk is the resultant of a degeneracy in which many strategy mixes
are consistent with overall stability. We also speculate that this new phenomenon
may explain the clustered volatility observed in some economic time series, such
as stock returns and exchange rates. In this context volatility clustering refers to
the statistical evidence that periods of higher than normal fluctuations in the data
tend to be clustered together [19, 20].
In the next section, we describe the model in detail and show how the
introduction of diverse strategies leads to equilibrium. In Section 3 we perform
computer simulations of a multiagent system allowing for strategy switching and
show the appearance of clustered volatility. We also establish that this new
phenomenon is not due to standard finite size effects, which decrease with the
number of agents [21]. In section 4 we exhibit this random walk for the case of
few strategies, and we determine the analytical criteria for its appearance. Finally,
in section 5, we show the precise nature of the degeneracy in the model that leads
to this random walk.
2 The Model
The model we consider attempts to capture the essential features of distributed
systems consisting of intentional agents that adaptively react to the dynamics that
unfold around them. Each agent acts in order to optimize its own utility. More
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specifically, we focus on the case in which agents have incomplete understanding
and reasoning about the underlying model of the entire system. The interesting
question is the extent to which imperfect knowledge on the part of agents can
lead to coordination of the system as a whole.
In the model agents accrue utility by making choices between several re-
sources. Each resource, r, has a performance metric or utility associated with
it, which we denote by Gr. This utility depends on the fraction, fr, of agents
using that resource. If resource usage is competitive, then the associated payoff
function will tend to decrease with the number of agents using that resource. On
the other hand, some resources could have a cooperative function so the overall
group performance is enhanced as more agents use that resource. In this case, the
payoff function for this resource will tend to increase with the fraction of agents
using it. For the sake of simplicity in this paper, we will limit the number of
resources to two.
In order to make resource choices, agents need to estimate the relative payoffs
of the various resources. Since agents do not have perfect information about the
use and utility of a particular resource, we make a distinction between the actual
payoffs, Gr(fr), that agents receive when they access them, and the perceived
payoffs, denoted by G^r, that they have before accessing them. This perceived
payoff models the variability in an agent’s ability to obtain exact information
about the system. Uncertainty is taken into account by assuming that the perceived
payoffs to be normally distributed around the actual payoff Gr , with a standard
deviation, , i.e. G^r  N (Gr; ). For simplicity, we will assume that all
perceived payoffs have the same standard deviation.
From the dynamical point of view, there is a specific rate at which agents
reevaluate their resource choices. We will assume that these reevaluations are
asynchronous and statistical in nature, and determined by a Poisson rate . In an
infinitesimal time increment t, the probability that a particular agent reevaluates
its choice is then given by t. In the simplest case where strategies are not a
factor in agent behavior, all agents process information about the resource utilities
in the same way, i.e., they are given G^1 and G^2, and they pick the resource that
maximizes utility.
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Dynamics without Strategies We first consider the dynamics of resource uti-
lization in the system in the limit of a large number of agents when agents do
not use strategies. In this case, ignoring fluctuations that are suppressed inversely
with the number of agents [21], the dynamics of the system for two resources
reduces to the simple equation [13]
df
dt
=  (f   (f)) (1)
where f is the fraction of agents using the first resource and  is the probability
that an agent will prefer the first resource over the second when it makes a choice.
In terms of the payoffs and uncertainty it is given by
(f) =
1
2

1 + erf

G1(f) G2(1  f)
2

(2)
where, again,  quantifies the uncertainty in resource performance. Since the total
number of agents is taken to be a constant,
f2 = 1   f1: (3)
Finally, the delays with which agents receive information about the resource
usages enters by replacing the payoff arguments in eqn. 2 by their corresponding
delayed values f(t) ! f(t   ).
In the case of zero uncertainty and delay, i.e.  = 0 and  = 0, agents
are perfectly aware of the state of the system and are able to rapidly optimize
their performance. In this case, resource contention in the system converges to a
Nash equilibrium such that the resource payoffs are equal for all agents. As the
uncertainty about payoffs increases, the equilibrium gradually moves away from
the optimum state, approaching a situation in which equal fractions of agents
use each resource. At the same time, the stochastic fluctuations associated with
the probabilistic nature of perceived payoffs become more and more noticeable.
Furthermore, if delays in information appear in the system, the solutions of eqn. 1
exhibit nonlinear and possibly chaotic oscillations, with a consequent degradation
in the performance of the system.
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Dynamics with Strategies The oscillatory and chaotic departures from the fixed
point can be brought back into equilibrium by using a mechanism originally pro-
posed by Hogg and Huberman [17]. It relies on allowing agents an extra dimen-
sion of behavior in order to choose among different strategies when evaluating
information about the resources that they contend for. Each agent independently
picks among the set of possible strategies according to how beneficial that strat-
egy is perceived to be. Strategies thus encapsulate the various ways in which
agents get and use information about the system in order to maximize their own
performance. In this paper we consider two types of possible strategies.
The first type of strategy involves agents making decisions based on the past
behavior of the system available to them. Such strategies may allow agents to take
advantage of periodic behavior in the system, to act in a trend following manner, or
to act as a contrarian moving against the trend. Such strategies might, for example,
involve taking linear combinations of past values in order to obtain a prediction
of future performance for the various resources. Specifically, considering the
simplest such strategies, an agent making a decision based on the strategy labeled
by the letter s, will use information in the system delayed by a time s. So, for
example, an agent using strategy s, will choose to pick the first resource with
probability s = (f(t  s)).
The second set of strategies we consider in this paper are strategies that
simply prefer one resource over another. In particular, an agent using strategy s,
will choose to use the first resource with a probability
s =
1
2

1 + erf

G1(f) G2(1  f) + bs
2

(4)
where bs quantifies the strategy’s preference to the first resource.
The state of the system is thus characterized not only by the fractions using
each resource, fresr , but also by the fraction of agents using resource r and strategy
s, frs. We will further define fstrs to be the fraction of agents using strategy s
and call this the strategy mix in the system.
The Hogg-Huberman mechanism has agents continually searching for an
optimal strategy as the dynamics of the system unfolds. In this way strategies
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that are obtaining the most useful information about the system increase in the
population at the expense of others. For example, strategy optimization might
involve agents observing the behavior and success of a few other agents and then
picking a good strategy based on that information; or perhaps, agents keep records
of how well strategies have performed in the past and make decisions based on
that information. In either case, and indeed quite generally, the net effect of the
strategy optimization procedure will be to change the usage of a certain strategy
according to its overall performance. Note that we have thus explicitly assumed
that agents do not have knowledge about which of the possible strategies is best.
Instead, they make their strategy choices as the system continues to evolve. The
strategy switching mechanism can thus be thought of as a way of learning in a
distributed manner, with no single agent having full knowledge of the underlying
model or state of the entire system.
In analogy with the resource reevaluation rate , we define another Poisson
rate, , which agents make strategy choices. We will call  the strategy switching
rate .. When an agent chooses a strategy s it does so with a probability denoted
by s. s satisfies the consistency requirement
P
s
s = 1, and is taken to be,
s =
P
r
frsGrP
r
fresr Gr
(5)
The denominator in this expression is simply a measure of the total utility in the
system, while the numerator is the amount of this total utility obtained by agents
using strategy s. This form of s guarantees the growth of strategies that create
the most payoff in the system. Note that agents are assumed to make resource and
strategy decisions separately and asynchronously. Moreover, we have assumed
that agent strategy decisions are independent of which resource they are using.
This assumption is very natural if agents switch resources regularly.
An example of the Hogg-Huberman mechanism in action is provided in figure
1 and figure 2, in which 99% of the agents are initially using the strategy with
lowest delay ie.  = 5. This result, obtained by solving the dynamical equations,
represents the average expected behavior in the system. As such, it ignores
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Fig. 1. Typical behavior of the Hogg—Huberman control mechanism [17] showing stabilization of resource
contention when agents are allowed to switch strategies. Plot shows the fraction f of agents using resource
1 as a function of time, obtained by solving a set of equations (valid in the limit as the number of agents
becomes large) [17]. Payoff functions are given by G1(f) = 4+7f 5:333f2 and G2(f) = 7 3f together
with parameters  = 1 and  = 0:25. Agents switch among 100 strategies at rate  = 1 with the result
that after transient oscillations the system settles into a state of stability. The 100 strategies are uniformly
separated between  = 5 and  = 45 and initially 99% of agents are using the strategy with lowest delay.
stochastic fluctuations that become less important as the number of agents in the
system is increased. It shows the remarkable stabilization of an initially unstable
system once strategy switching is allowed. As can be seen initially the system is
quite chaotic; however, once agents are allowed to optimize and switch strategies
over a large enough set of delays, the system finds an equilibrium distribution of
strategies (depicted in figure 2) in which local agent behaviors at the microscopic
level lead to a macroscopic equilibrium. The system is also robust in that sudden
perturbations to the system eventually relax back to equilibrium [17].
When strategy choices are included, the simple eqn. 1 must be modified. The
generalization of eqn. 1 is [17],
dfrs
dt
= 
 
fstrs rs   frs

+ (fresr s   frs) (6)
where rs is the probability that an agent using strategy s chooses to use resource r,
and s is the probability that an agent will switch to strategy s. The interpretation
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of eqns. 6 is facilitated by summing them over all the resources and then again
over all strategies. The equations describing resource and strategy switching are
then given by,
dfresr
dt
=  
 
fresr  
X
s
fstrs rs
!
(7)
dfstrs
dt
=   fstrs   s (8)
The term preceded by  on the right hand side of eqn. 6 is analogous to the
right hand side terms in eqn. 1, with rs being the probability that an agent using
strategy s chooses to use resource r. Eqn. 8 represents the effects of strategy
switching among the distribution of strategies within the agent population. This
strategy mix affects the overall resource allocation in the system through eqn. 7.
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Fig. 2. The time evolution of the distribution of strategies for the simulation in figure 1. Vertical axis
denotes the ratio fstrs (t)=fstrs (0) where initially 99% are using the strategy with lowest delay. Strategies
use delays that are uniformly spread between  = 5 and  = 45. For long times, the system evolves into
a steady state distribution of strategies that is not unique.
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3 Clustered Volatility
We should point that even when the resource utilizations come to a steady
equilibrium, agents continue to vary their strategies in order to locally increase
their utilities. In this way the system remains continually adaptive to the environ-
ment around it. For example, resource payoffs may suddenly change drastically,
in which case the system may not be able to maintain stability if the strategy
mix is frozen in time. Alternatively, resource payoffs might gradually change
over time in which case the system must be continuously responsive to changes
in the payoffs.
While the results we presented in figures 1 and 2 were obtained analytically,
it is of interest to perform computer experiments to observe the stabilizing effect
of strategy switching. The results of such an experiment are seen in figure 3 for
a typical simulation of 5000 agents. The parameters, payoffs, and strategies
are the same as in figure 1. The reward mechanism in the simulations has
been slightly modified from that in eqn. 5 to insure that each strategy always
maintains a minimal population of 5 agents. Comparison with the theoretical
result presented in figure 1, shows that there are qualitatively different features
that occur in the experiment. The simulations show the appearance of bursts of
activity superimposed on a background of small fluctuations around the predicted
equilibrium value. While the small background fluctuations are the result of the
fact that agent decisions are themselves probabilistic, the larger bursts are the
result of a more subtle mechanism, which we elucidate below.
To stress the generality of this type of behavior we show in figure 4 the
results of another computer experiment in which all agents use information with
a delay of  = 10 and in which strategies correspond to forming preferences
towards the various resources. The simulation again consists of 5000 agents with
20 strategies. The corresponding preferences in eqn. 4, bs, are uniformly chosen
from the interval [ 1; 1]. In the case of strategies based on the preferences towards
particular resources, numerical integration of the eqns. frs show that given this
set of possible strategies, the system achieves stability at resource utilizations
given by allocation among the resources given by G1(f1) = G2(f2). Once again,
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Fig. 3. Typical behavior seen in computer simulations of contention over two resources. The payoffs,
parameters, and possible strategies are as in figure 1. The simulation consists of 5000 agents with 80% of
the agents initially using the strategy with delay  = 5. Plots show the fraction f of agents using resource
1 as a function of time. To insure that each strategy always maintains a minimal population, we modify
the reward mechanism so that agents cannot switch out of strategies that have less than five agents. Agents
continually switch strategies in trying to achieve local improvements. As a result, the system sometimes
goes unstable and the equilibrium is punctuated by bursts of activity.
the simulation shows that even when the number of agents is large the system
exhibits bursts of activity.
As explained above and illustrated in figure 1, the strategy switching mecha-
nism leads to a stabilizing strategy mix. This strategy mix, however, is not unique.
Rather, there is a repertoire that is consistent with a stable equilibrium. Thus once
the system equilibrates agents continually switch strategies in order to optimize
their own performance. This is achieved without destroying the overall system
stability with respect to resource utilization. This implies an effective degeneracy
whereby a number of strategy mixes are consistent with the observed equilibrium.
At the dynamical level, this degeneracy manifests itself in an effective random
walk in the space of strategies. As time goes on this random walk can occasion-
ally push the strategy mix into values that are not consistent with stable resource
contention. This results in the observed bursts of activity, which are subsequently
quenched by the Hogg-Huberman mechanism.
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Fig. 4. Typical behavior of a system with 5000 agents when particular strategies involve preferences towards
specific resources. Resource utilization information is delayed by  = 10 and the payoffs and parameters
are as in figure 1. In contrast to the case of purely time delayed strategies, where different strategy mixes
either stabilized or unstabilized the same resource utilizations, different mixes of preferences correspond to
different equilibria in resource utilization.
In order to study this phenomenon in greater detail, we consider the simpler
case in which the agents are limited to three strategies. Since we need to guarantee
that there are indeed strategy mixes that stabilize the resource contention, we limit
one of the strategies to have zero delay. We choose the other strategies to have
delays  = 3, and  = 5, and set the payoffs, uncertainty , and the rate  in
the system to be as before.
Figure 5 shows the results of a simulation with 2000 agents for two values
of the strategy reevaluation rates,  = 0:01 and  = 0:2. The observed behavior
clearly shows a stable equilibrium punctuated by bursts of instability. Note that
for the reevaluation rate  = 0:01 bursts occur less frequently than in the case of
the higher value of , but when they do occur they tend to relax back in slower
fashion than in the case of high reevaluation rate. There is thus a trade-off in the
rate of the reevaluation rate: for higher , the system relaxes back to equilibrium
faster, but also tends to go unstable more frequently; for smaller , the system will
take a longer time to relax back to equilibrium, but also tends to stay stable longer.
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Fig. 5. Computer simulations of contention over two resources with strategy switching among 3 strategies.
Simulations consisted of 2000 agents total. System parameters and payoffs are as in figure 1. The three
strategies have associated delays of 0, 3, and 5 time units respectively. Top figure shows results from using
a switching rate  = 0:01. Note again the stability punctuated by bursts of activity. Bottom figure shows
results for a faster switching rate  = 0:2. In this case bursts occur more frequently but have shorter
durations when they occur.
4 A Theory of Bursts
Stability Properties
In this section we discuss the stability of resource contention for different
strategy mixes. The results of the previous section show that performance
driven strategy switching provides a mechanism through which the distribution of
strategies stabilizes the resource contention in the system. But the mix of strategies
cannot be totally arbitrary, for there will be strategy mixes for which the system
will become unstable. In order to determine the range of strategy mixes that are
consistent with stability, one needs to perform a linear stability analysis around
the equilibrium point generated by the dynamics. We here outline the results of
such an analysis [17]. Small perturbations away from equilibrium evolve in time
as et. This means that for positive, real values of  the perturbation will grow
in time, and for  negative it will decay, relaxing back to equilibrium.
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Fig. 6. Stability of regions in strategy space for parameters and delays used in figure 5. The horizontal axis
denotes the percentage of agents using zero delay,  = 0 and the vertical axis denotes the percentage of agents
using delay  = 3 . Regions of strategy space that stabilize resource usage are denoted by S and unstable
regions are denoted by U. Also shown are the points in strategy space mapped out by the  = 0:2 simulation
in figure 5 from before a burst occurs until after its occurrence (from time units 4800 to 6600). Strategies
randomly move around the stable region while resource contention is still stable. Once the strategies cross
into the unstable region, a burst of activity occurs, and the strategy mix is pushed back into the stable region.
For a given strategy mix, fstrs ,  is determined by the following equation [17],
 +   
X
s
fstrs 
0
s(feq) e
 s = 0 (9)
Here 0s is the derivative of the function, s which is given by eqn. 4 evaluated
at the relevant fixed point, feq. This fixed point is determined by
feq =
X
s
fss(feq): (10)
In eqn. 9, s is the delay relevant to strategy s, and bs is the preference towards
the use of a given resource by strategy s. A particular strategy mix will therefore
lead to stable resource allocation if all the solutions (in general there are an
infinite number of them) to eqn. 9 have negative real parts. This will guarantee
that fluctuations away from the fixed point in resource contention will eventually
relax back to the equilibrium. Notice that when strategies are purely unbiased
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and thus specified only by a delay, the fixed points in resource utilization are the
same as those in which information is not delayed.
Since each strategy mix will either lead to stable or unstable resource con-
tention, the strategy space can itself can be broken up into two regions: a region
containing strategy mixes for which the resource allocations are stable, and an-
other containing strategy mixes for which resource allocations are unstable.
Figure 6 shows the regions of strategy space that support stable and unstable
resource contention for the parameters and strategies as in figure 5 (the value
of  does not affect these regions). In this case, since there are 3 strategies
( = 0; 3; and 5), and since the fractions of agents using all strategies must add
up to one, each strategy mix is uniquely defined by the fraction of agents using
the first two strategies with delays 1 = 0 and 2 = 3. Recall that a strategy
mix is in the stability region if solutions for  in eqn. 9 exist that have negative
real part. Note the rather large region in the strategy space for which resource
allocation is stable. Superimposed on this figure is the evolution of the strategy
mix for the simulation shown in the lower part of figure 5.
Note that when the strategy mix is in the stable region, it seems to behave
randomly with no particular bias. Agents switch strategies with no penalty since
all strategies perform equally well. As a result, small fluctuations (in this case
induced by having a finite number of agents) make the strategy population execute
a random walk within the region of stability. However, after the strategy mix
moves into the unstable region, resource contention becomes unstable. Once the
resource contention is destabilized, strategy switching is once again biased towards
enhancing strategies that perform well. The strategy switching mechanism then
forces the mix back into the region of stability, thus stabilizing the resource
contention in the system. This process then accounts for the characteristic bursts
found in the computer experiments that we described above.
The fact that strategies tend to perform equally well when the overall system
is in equilibrium is related to the fact that the strategy switching mechanism in
the system is highly adaptive. This adaptability not only allows the system to
automatically search out strategy mixes that stabilize resource utilization, but also
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manifests itself in a degeneracy of solutions for which resource utilizations are
stable. We discuss this degeneracy in the next section.
5 Degeneracies in Multiagent Systems
Since our model is intended to capture general features of an adaptive agent
system, we assume that the agent population is not “preprogrammed” towards
any particular distribution. We call this assumption neutral adaptability. This
is the case for the mechanism given by eqn. 5. Rather, the agent population
adapts with respect to the external environment and variations in the resource
payoffs, leading to strategy mixes that stabilize the system. There are, however,
many strategy mixes that stabilize the resource contention. It is precisely this
degeneracy in the stabilizing mixes that makes the system susceptible to bursts
of volatility characterized above.
In order to better examine this degeneracy, we reparametrize the system
equations for frs (r = 1; :::;Nr, s = 1; :::; Ns) so that , s couples directly to
only Ns equations rather than to the NsNr such equations as given by eqn. 6.
This reparametrization is given by fresr , fstrs , and
Frs = f
res
r f
str
s   frs; (11)
subject to the consistency conditions,8>><>>>:
P
r
fresr = 1P
s
fstrs = 1P
s
Frs =
P
r
Frs = 0
(12)
With these conditions the number of degrees of freedom for the corresponding
parameters are given by:
8<:
fresr : (Nr   1)
fstrs : (Ns   1)
Frs : (Ns   1)(Nr   1)
(13)
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Note the system has a total of NrNs   1 degrees of freedom. Together, these
quantities completely specify the system space for the strategy-resource system,
leading to the following dynamical equations,
8>>>><>>>>:
dFrs
dt =  (+ )Frs + fstrs
P
s0
fstrs0 rs0   rs

dfresr
dt =  

fresr  
P
s
fstrs rs

dfstrs
dt =  
 
fstrs   s
 (14)
With these expressions for the dynamics, we now turn to a study of the degeneracy
in the system that is useful in analyzing the occurrence of bursts.
Neutral Adaptability
We now make explicit a notion of neutral adaptability. First, we assume the
existence of a nonempty set, Er , consistent with the equilibration of the resource
utilization fr (df
res
r
dt = 0) and the equilibration of Frs (dFrsdt = 0). In terms of the
second equation from the triplet above this implies that,
fresr  
X
s
fstrs rs = 0 (15)
We now define a system to be neutrally adaptable with respect to the set Er if
it can settle into strategy mix equilibria contained in Er. From the right hand
side of the last equation in the triplet above we can state this mathematically as
s = fs on Er . Since this means that
dfstrs
dt
= 0 (16)
on that set, the agent population is macroscopically unbiased towards any partic-
ular population of strategies on such a set. In this way, if there exists a strategy
distribution that stabilizes resource contention, the system can automatically adapt
to that distribution and stabilize the entire system without any “preprogramming”.
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Delays and Preferences We now discuss the specific form for s given by eqn.
5 for the case of time-delayed strategies. In this case, the relevant set Er is given
by the constraints 
fresr = (f
res
r )
Frs = 0
(17)
This set forms an Ns   1 dimensional manifold that can be parametrized by the
values of fstrs , in which the probability that strategy s is chosen by an agent is
s =
P
r
 
fresr f
str
s   Frs

GrP
r
fresr Gr
= fs: (18)
More intuitively, neutral adaptability is here a result of the fact that strategy
switching does not differentiate between different time delayed strategies when
the contention over resources with degrees of freedom specified by fresr and Frs
have relaxed to an equilibrium.
When strategies consist of preferences towards different resources, the rele-
vant set Er is determined instead by the constraints,8><>:
Gr(f
res
r ) = Gr0(f
res
r0 ) 8r0
fresr =
P
s
fstrs 
 
bs


dFrs
dt = 0
(19)
This is a Ns   2 dimensional manifold that once again satisfies the neutrality
condition,
s =
P
r
 
fresr f
str
s   Frs

GrP
r
fresr Gr
= fstrs  
X
r
Frs = f
str
s : (20)
Strategy switching among different preferences does not differentiate between
strategy distributions that hold the system at resource allocations that have equal
payoff.
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Since neutrally adaptive switching mechanisms do not differentiate between
different strategy mixes, it follows that sections in the system space are degenerate
and that surrounding regions are approximately so. In these regions the strategy
population continuously changes its composition and approaches stability bound-
aries without any corrective mechanism. In turn, the stability of such systems
does not increase as rapidly with agent population size as might be expected from
standard fluctuation corrections [21] to the meanfield approximation eqn. 6.
Discussion Having established how neutral adaptability is associated with clus-
tered volatility we now point out that it is only a sufficient, but not necessary con-
dition. For example, consider the case in which agents switch between delayed
strategies randomly with probability  and according to the switching mechanism
s with probability 1   . In this case the last equation in the triplet eqn. 14
is changed to
dfs
dt
=  
0@fs   (1  )
P
r
fresrs GrP
r
fresr Gr
  
Ns
1A (21)
Similarly to the previous analysis, we consider the set Er given by 17 that
consists of equilibrium configurations for the degrees of freedom fs and Frs. On
this set, the second term in the right hand side of 21 reduces to (1  )fsas in
the neutrally adaptive case, and becomes
dfs
dt
=
Er
 

fs   1
Ns

(22)
This equation shows the existence of an entropic ’force’ that pushes the strategy
mix towards a population of equally populated strategies, i.e. fs = 1Ns . Assuming
that   1 this force will be prominent only when the system is within the
stability boundary. If we assume that the uniform strategy population lies outside
the stability boundary for resource contention, then this entropic contribution will
tend to enhance the generation of bursts, and hence volatility clustering.
Therefore, neutral adaptability is not a necessary condition for the appearance
of clustered volatility. Rather, neutral adaptability is a convenient assumption for
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studying volatility clustering. Without this assumption, resource payoff functions
would require a certain amount of tuning for the phenomenon to appear. It is
the degeneracy in strategy mixes that stabilize resource contention that plays a
central role. This degeneracy is a result of the fact that boundedly rational agents
cannot discern between strategies when the system is close to stability. As a result
the strategy switching mechanism that dramatically stabilized the system becomes
less effective resulting in clustered bursts of activity.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the dynamics of a multiagent system whose
members continuously modify their behavior in response to the dynamics that
unfold within the system. Their behavior is driven by local optimization of the
utilities that agents accrue when gaining access to resources. Agents decide on
the basis of having bounded rationality, which implies imperfect information and
delayed knowledge about the present state of the system.
Given these constraints we have shown that with the introduction of a set
of diverse strategies, an initially unstable system can flow towards equilibrium.
But within this equilibrium, fluctuations among possible strategy mixes that are
consistent with the fixed point lead to the phenomenon of volatility clustering.
Since many possible distributions of strategies are consistent with equilibrium,
as time progresses the agent population explores different strategy mixes. These
underlying fluctuations have the structure of a random walk in the space of strate-
gies and show up even when there are large number of agents. If a strategy mix
moves beyond the boundary of stability there results bursts of momentary insta-
bility. These bursts eventually relax into a stable equilibrium. This mechanism of
stability punctuated by clustered volatility appears to be quite general in systems
where agents explore strategies in search of local improvements.
In order to analytically understand the appearance of these bursts, we estab-
lished the stability boundaries and the nature of the degeneracies in the system.
We also introduced the notion of neutrally adaptive strategy switching which pro-
vides a sufficient condition for the appearance of volatility clustering. We also
discussed the existence of other mechanisms that can lead to the same phenom-
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enon, such as the existence of an entropic mechanism that leads to a system
evolution whose asymptotic behavior is characterized by a uniform sampling of
all the strategy mixes of the system.
We also suggested that this new phenomenon may explain the clustered
volatility observed in some economic time series, such as stock returns and
exchange rates. In the case of high inflation, it has been pointed out that the
daily fluctuations of currency exchanges exhibit the same bursty behavior that
we discovered [22]. It is not clear however, that our mechanism works in that
context, for it has been pointed out that in inflationary times such bursts might be
the result of amplified system responses to exogenous fluctuations.
This work also offers a complementary view of clustered volatility to that
recently presented via computer simulations of adaptive agents by Grannan and
Swindle [23]. The formalism we have presented may also be helpful in explaining
their results on a more analytical basis. In addition, the explicit introduction of
dynamical equations allows for a determination of the nature of the equilibrium,
as well as the parameter values for which this phenomenon is likely to appear.
Moreover, it opens the way to study more complicated sets of strategies.
Finally, there remains the interesting problem of resource contention in com-
puter networks, where the introduction of servers with increased and specialized
capabilities will lead to a desire on the part of users to access them, thereby cre-
ating long queues and increased costs. If computational agents are programmed
to take advantage of local fluctuations in the use of these resources, the results
of this paper might have implications in the design and implementation of widely
distributed computational systems.
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